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“There is nothing more dangerous than a man without 
hope.” – Craig Price1 
INTRODUCTION 
On a dark summer night, with the only light coming from a 
sky of stars, a young man hopped a stockade fence and began the 
calculated process of peering through windows and turning the 
knobs on locked doors, searching for any way into a quiet 
suburban house.2 Finally, he found an entry point—a wide open 
kitchen window with a wire mesh screen that was easily slashed 
open within moments.3 After climbing through the window and 
 
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger  Williams  University  School  of 
Law, 2019. Thank you, Professor Andrew Horwitz, for your support and 
guidance. A special thank you to my family for their love and encouragement, 
especially my brother, Joseph McBurney, who inspires me daily as an 
example of what it means to be dedicated to the practice of law and justice. 
1. Mark Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’ – Craig Price’s Story, 
PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 7, 2004, at A1. All information from articles written by 
Mark Arsenault appeared in a three-day series published in the Providence 
Journal. See id.; see also Mark Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’ – Craig Price’s 
story, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A1; Mark Arsenault, ‘Flame of hope’ – 
Craig Price’s story, PROVIDENCE J., Mar. 9, 2004, at A1. Arsenault visited  
with Craig Price in jail two times per month, from mid-2002 to 2004. 
Arsenault, ‘Into Another World’, supra. Arsenault was not permitted to bring 
a notepad or tape-recorder into the interviews, but Price and he exchanged 
letters based on their conversations. Id. 
2. See Arsenault, ‘This Dark Deed’, supra note 1. 
3. See id. 
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onto the kitchen table, he began stealthily moving through the 
house looking for his intended victim.4 However, what he came 
across instead was the hand of an eight-year-old girl touching his 
stomach while her eyes met his.5 As he tried to keep the girl from 
screaming by clasping his hand over her mouth, he tripped, 
allowing the child to let out a short high-pitched scream.6 At this 
point, everything started to deteriorate. As the child’s mother 
appeared, the intruder slammed her against the wall, whereupon 
she desperately gasped for her children to call 911.7  Another 
child, this one slightly older than the first, knelt beside her 
mother, saying nothing as if she were in shock.8 
Two days later, the bodies of Melissa, Jennifer, and Joan 
Heaton were found inside their home.9 Melissa, eight years old, 
was stabbed seven times.10 Jennifer, ten years old, was stabbed 
sixty-two times.11 Joan, the mother, was stabbed eleven times.12 
The killer had taken with him evidence of the murder weapons, 
including the set of steak knives in a kitchen block Joan bought 
hours earlier.13 This is not the story of a far removed tragedy that 
one may only hear recounted late into the night while watching 
crime show reruns. This is the story of a family from Warwick, 
Rhode Island, whose gruesome murders on September 1, 1989, left 
Rhode Islanders perpetually paranoid and fearful.14  This  fear 
was amplified when investigators linked the Heatons’ murderer to 
the unsolved death of Rebecca Spencer, who had been brutally 
murdered in her Warwick home two years earlier.15 As may be 
 
4. See id. Price asserts that he was planning to kill Joan Heaton, but 
had every intention of letting her two children live. See id. 
5. See id. 
6. See id. 
7. See id. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
11. See id. 
12. See id. 
13. See id. A receipt reflected a purchase of a set of steak knives in a 
knife block at the Christmas Tree Shop in Warwick, Rhode Island, at 7:24 PM 
on September 1, 1989, by Joan Heaton, just hours before she and her 
daughters were murdered. Id. 
14. See  id. Before anyone was charged, two Warwick gun dealers 
reported selling eleven firearms the week after the murders. See id. 
15. See  id. On July 27, 1987, thirteen-year-old Craig Price killed 
twenty-seven-year-old Rebecca Spencer, stabbing her fifty-eight times. Id. 
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expected from a place where one can drive the length of the state 
in just an hour, the people of Rhode Island have yet to heal from 
this wound inflicted on them by the “official state demon”: fifteen- 
year-old Craig Price.16 
At the time of Price’s conviction, the maximum sentence that 
a juvenile offender could receive was detention at the Training 
School until his or her twenty-first birthday.17 A swift and 
reverberant public outcry spurred the Rhode Island General 
Assembly to amend the state juvenile sentencing scheme to permit 
juvenile offenders of any age to be waived into adult court and 
thereupon be subject to adult sentencing, including being 
sentenced to life without parole (LWOP).18 However, these post- 
Price changes predated a series of United States Supreme Court 
cases recognizing that juveniles are constitutionally different from 
adults, and thus, are not deserving of the harshest punishment.19 
In its tripartite ruling on juvenile sentencing in Roper v. 
Simmons,20 Graham v. Florida,21 and Miller v. Alabama,22 the 
United States Supreme Court has indicated that it is a rare 
instance where LWOP is appropriate for even the most egregious 
offenses committed by a juvenile.23 The United States Supreme 
Court has not addressed whether a categorical ban on LWOP for 
juvenile offenders is constitutionally required, but given all that 
the Court has said, it follows that the imposition of a LWOP 
sentence for a juvenile offender violates the Eighth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8, of the 
 
16. See id. 
17. See Arsenault, ‘Flame of hope,’ supra note 1. The Rhode Island 
Training School is a detention facility “[f]or youth who have been adjudicated 
as delinquent and those awaiting trial for serious offenses.” Juvenile 
Correctional Services, R.I. DEP’T OF CHILD., YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, 
http://www.dcyf.ri.gov/juvenile_corrections.php (last modified Apr. 3, 2015). 
18. See John J. Cloherty, III, The Serious Juvenile Offender in the Adult 
Criminal System: The Jurisprudence of Rhode Island’s Waiver and 
Certification Procedures, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 407, 407–08 (1992); see also 
infra Part II.B. 
19. The “Craig Price Legislation” was passed by the General Assembly in 
1990. See Cloherty, supra note 18, at 407–08 nn.5–6. The United States 
Supreme Court rendered decisions considering the constitutionality of 
juvenile sentences between the years of 2005 to 2012. See infra Part I.C. 
20. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
21. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
22. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
23. See infra Part I.C. 
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Rhode Island Constitution.24 LWOP for a juvenile offender 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the sentence is 
unconstitutionally disproportionate when viewed in the context of 
the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders. As the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court has declared, “it is the prerogative of the 
General Assembly to define criminal offenses and set forth the 
sentences for those crimes.”25 Accordingly, the General Assembly 
should pass legislation categorically eliminating LWOP sentences 
for juvenile offenders and giving all juvenile offenders a 
meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation at a parole board hearing after fifteen 
years served.26 
This Comment contains three parts. Following this 
Introduction, Part I explores the background of LWOP sentences 
for juvenile offenders, beginning with the distinction between 
mandatory and discretionary LWOP sentences, then moving to the 
current state of juvenile sentencing law in Rhode Island. Part I 
then shifts focus to three decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, which have recognized that juveniles are constitutionally 
different from adults for purposes of sentencing. Part I concludes 
with a comparison of cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Rhode Island and United States Constitutions. Part II argues  
that Rhode Island can, and should, categorically ban LWOP 
sentences for juvenile offenders because LWOP for juveniles 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, makes limited 
 
24. See supra Part II.A. 
25. State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I. 2007). 
26. See H. 5183, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S. 0237A, 
2017  Gen.  Assemb.,  Jan.  Sess.  (R.I.  2017). During the 2017 legislative 
session, the Senate passed the bill, twenty-eight in favor and eight against, 
while  the  companion  House  bill  was  held  for  further study.  Jacqueline 
Tempera & Patrick Anderson, R.I. Senate passes bill ending life-without- 
parole sentences for juveniles, PROVIDENCE J. (June 15, 2017, 5:59 PM), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20170615/ri-senate-passes-bill- 
ending-life-without-parole-sentences-for-juveniles. The legislation was re- 
introduced during the 2018 session and assigned different bill numbers— 
Senate Bill 2272 and House Bill 7596. See S.B. 2272, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. 
(R.I. 2018); H.B. 7596, 2018 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2018); see also Katherine 
Gregg, R.I. bill would allow earlier parole for those sentenced for crimes 
committed under age 18, PROVIDENCE    J.  (March 27, 2018), 
http://www.providencejournal.com/news/20180327/ri-bill-would-allow-earlier- 
parole-for-those-sentenced-for-crimes-committed-under-age-18. 
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contributions to the goals of punishment, and violates 
proportionality. Part II then proposes that the appropriate cure  
for the unconstitutionality of Rhode Island’s current sentencing 
scheme is passage of legislation by the Rhode Island General 
Assembly that categorically bans LWOP sentences for juvenile 
offenders and provides for mandatory parole review hearings for 
juvenile offenders after fifteen years served. Part II concludes by 
showing that the arguments against passage of legislation 
advanced by the Rhode Island Attorney General are unsound, 
unwarranted, and fail to accurately recognize the unique 
characteristics of youthfulness that render LWOP a cruel and 
unusual punishment when imposed on a juvenile offender. 
Finally, Part III concludes by challenging the Rhode Island 
General Assembly to give every juvenile offender hope to one day 
demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required for release 
at a parole hearing by enacting passage of appropriate legislation. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Life Without Parole 
The United States Supreme Court has held that mandatory 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional.27 
Mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes treat all offenders 
identically and force the sentencing judge to prescribe this 
sentence for every offender found guilty of a crime carrying the 
punishment of LWOP.28 It is unconstitutional to use a mandatory 
sentencing scheme when imposing LWOP on a juvenile offender 
because “mandatory penalties, by their nature, preclude a 
sentencer from taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth 
of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.”29 
The constitutionality of a discretionary LWOP sentence for a 
juvenile homicide offender has never been addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court, nor by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court, leaving it a viable sentence to be imposed on juvenile 
offenders. A discretionary sentencing scheme allows for the 
sentencer to use his or her discretion with regard to how to 
 
27. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465; see infra Part I.C.3. 
28. See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 
90 (2015). 
29. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476. 
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sentence the offender, including, for a juvenile offender, taking 
into account “an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics 
and circumstances attendant to it.”30 These youth-specific 
characteristics and circumstances include: 
(1) the offender’s “chronological age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and 
failure to appreciate risks and consequences”; 
(2) “the family and home environment that surrounds 
[the offender]—and from which he cannot usually 
extricate himself—no matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional”; 
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including 
the extent of [the offender’s] participation in the conduct 
and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected [them]”; and 
(4) “that [the offender] might have been charged and 
convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth—for example, [their] inability to 
deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a 
plea agreement) or [their] incapacity to assist [their] own 
attorneys.”31 
However, as discussed below, a sentencer’s discretion to account 
for these youth-specific characteristics and circumstances is not 
enough to overcome the unconstitutionality of imposing a LWOP 
sentence on any juvenile offender. 
B. Current State of Juvenile Sentencing Law in Rhode Island 
Under Rhode Island’s current statutory scheme, a juvenile 
offender who has been charged with certain statutorily 
enumerated crimes will be sentenced under one of two divergent 
sentencing schemes—either lenient punishment as a child in 
family court or standard sentencing as an adult in adult court 
pursuant to a waiver from juvenile court to adult court.32 Absent  
a waiver to adult court or a certification in Family Court, no 
sentence or probation imposed upon a juvenile offender can last 
 
 
30. Id.; see also Chang et al., supra note 28, at 99. 
31. Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78. 
32. See id. at 488; 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 14-1-1 to -71 (2002). 
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past his or her nineteenth birthday.33 As such, in order for the 
standard adult sentencing scheme—which includes discretionary 
LWOP34—to be imposed upon a juvenile offender, the crime 
charged must be punishable by life imprisonment or constitute a 
felony if committed by an adult.35 To effectuate the waiver 
process, the Attorney General must move for a waiver hearing in 
the family court, whereupon the court must find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) probable cause exists that 
the offense charged has been committed and that the child 
charged has committed it; and (2) that the child’s prior offenses, 
history of treatment, or the heinous or premeditated nature of the 
offense is such that the court finds that the interests of society or 
the protection of the public necessitate the waiver of jurisdiction of 
the court over the child.36 
Once a juvenile offender has been waived into adult court, the 
standard adult sentencing scheme applies. In Rhode Island, the 
penalty for first-degree murder is life and the penalty for first- 
degree murder plus an aggravating factor is discretionary 
LWOP.37 If a defendant is sentenced to life in prison with the 
 
33. 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-6 (2002). In 2007, the age limit in which no 
sentence or probation imposed upon a juvenile offender could extend beyond 
was changed from twenty-one to nineteen. Id. Certification in Family Court 
occurs after a showing of certain required elements by the prosecution. Once 
a defendant is certified, he or she is entitled to a jury trial on the charges; 
this is the only situation when a defendant is afforded a jury trial in Family 
Court. After being found guilty at the jury trial (or bench trial if the 
defendant waived his or her right to a jury), an adult sentence can be  
imposed upon the defendant. The defendant will serve up until his or her 
nineteenth birthday at the training school, whereafter the balance of the 
sentence can be suspended with probation, or the offender can be ordered to 
serve the remainder of his or her sentence at the Adult Correctional 
Institution. See Cloherty, supra note 18, at 428–29. 
34. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002). 
35. 14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-7 (2002). 
36. Id. §§ 14-1-7, -7.1. If the juvenile is charged with a crime that 
constitutes a felony if committed by an adult and the juvenile is under 
sixteen-years-old, the court must make minor additional findings to 
effectuate the certification or waiver process. Id. § 14-1-7.2. 
37. These aggravating factors are: 
(1) committed intentionally while engaged in the commission of 
another capital offense or other felony for which life imprisonment 
may be imposed; (2) committed in a manner creating a great risk of 
death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device or 
substance which would normally be hazardous to the life of more 
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possibility of parole, a parole permit may be issued after a 
minimum of fifteen to twenty-five years served, depending on the 
year        and        the        crime        that        was       committed.38 
 
than one person; (3) committed at the direction of another person in 
return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that 
person; (4) committed in a manner involving torture or an 
aggravated battery to the victim; (5) committed against any member 
of the judiciary, law enforcement officer, corrections employee, 
assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general, or 
firefighter arising from the lawful performance of his or her official 
duties; (6) committed by a person who at the time of the murder was 
committed to confinement in the adult correctional institutions or 
the state reformatory for women upon conviction of a felony; or (7) 
committed during the course of the perpetration or attempted 
perpetration of felony manufacture, sale, delivery or other 
distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the 
provisions of chapter 28 of title 21; shall be imprisoned for life and if 
ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that person 
shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment. 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002). Additionally, LWOP can be sentenced if 
any person under the age of eighteen is kidnapped “by a person other than 
his or her natural or adopted parent dies as a direct result of the  
kidnapping.” 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2.1 (2002). If the prosecution, within 
the proper time frame, recommends that LWOP be imposed, 
the court shall, upon return of a verdict of guilty of murder in the 
first degree by the jury, instruct the jury to determine whether it has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder committed 
by the defendant involved one of the circumstances enumerated in § 
11-23-2 or 11-23-2.1 as the basis for imposition of a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole. If after deliberation the jury finds  
that one or more of the enumerated circumstances was present, it 
shall state in writing, signed by the foreperson of the jury, which 
circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Upon return of an affirmative verdict, the court shall conduct a 
presentence hearing. At the hearing, the court shall permit the 
attorney general and the defense to present additional evidence 
relevant to a determination of the sentence to be imposed . . . . After 
hearing evidence and argument relating to the presence or absence 
of aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall, in its 
discretion, sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment 
without parole or life imprisonment. 
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19.2-1 (2002). 
38. See 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13 (2002). For example, a prisoner 
sentenced to life imprisonment for first or second-degree murder committed 
after July 10, 1989, but before June 30, 1995, must serve fifteen years before 
the parole permit may be issued. A prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment 
for the same crime committed after June 30, 1995, but before July 1, 2015, 
must serve twenty years before the parole permit may be issued. In contrast, 
a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment for first or second-degree murder 
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Since there are no separate penalty provisions for juvenile 
offenders who have been waived into adult court and there is no 
minimum age for those who may be transferred to adult court for 
a crime punishable by life imprisonment, a child of any age can be 
subjected to the standard adult sentencing scheme, including life 
in prison or LWOP.39 
C. The United States Supreme Court Recognizes That Juveniles 
are Constitutionally Different from Adults 
In a series of cases from 2005 to 2012, the United States 
Supreme Court developed a body of case law recognizing that 
juveniles are constitutionally different from adults and, because of 
these differences, certain punishments that are constitutional 
when applied to adults are rendered unconstitutional when 
applied to juveniles.40 
1. Death Penalty for Juvenile Offenders Under Eighteen Years 
Old is Unconstitutional 
The death penalty for all juvenile offenders under the age of 
eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.41 In Roper v. Simmons, the United 
States Supreme Court relied upon three significant differences 
between juveniles and adults that indicate juveniles cannot be 
 
 
committed after July 1, 2015, must serve twenty-five years before the parole 
permit may be issued. See id. 
39. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002); 13 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13 
(2002). While there are no categorical age limits imposed on when a juvenile 
can be transferred to adult court, the juvenile must be competent to stand 
trial. A person is considered to be “competent to stand trial if he or she is  
able to understand the character and consequences of the proceedings against 
him or her and is able properly to assist in his or her defense.” 40.1 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 40.1-5.3-3 (2006). 
40. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 
U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
41. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568. Decades earlier, in 1979, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court declared that the death penalty statute as written in 
Rhode Island General Laws section 11-23-2 violated the Eighth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution because it amounted to cruel and unusual 
punishment. See State v. Cline, 397 A.2d 1309, 1311 (R.I. 1979); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend VIII. In 1984, the Rhode Island General Assembly removed 
the death penalty proviso from the statute, instead replacing it with life 
imprisonment. See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002). 
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considered among the worst offenders, and these differences have 
continued to be affirmed as crucial distinctions between juveniles 
and adults in subsequent decisions.42 
First, children have “[a] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” which “often result in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.”43 This leads 
to “recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking” by 
juveniles.44 Second, children “are more vulnerable or susceptible 
to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer 
pressure” and they have “less control, or less experience with 
control, over their own environment” resulting in an inability for 
juveniles “to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.”45 
Lastly, a juvenile offender’s character and personality traits are 
not fully formed, making them less fixed, and less likely to be 
“evidence of irretrievably depraved character.”46 In support of a 
juvenile’s flexible character, the Roper Court relied on studies that 
evidenced that most juveniles who engage in illegal activities do 
not develop into chronic offenders with deep-rooted criminogenic 
behaviors in adulthood.47 
Taken together, these three differences between juvenile and 
adult offenders highlight that juveniles have diminished 
culpability when compared to adults and, as such, it is 
unconstitutional to sentence a juvenile offender to the death 
penalty.48 
2. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Nonhomicide Offenders is 
Unconstitutional 
A LWOP sentence for juvenile nonhomicide offenders violates 
the Eighth Amendment.49 In Graham, the Court described LWOP 
 
42. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 471; Graham, 560 U.S. 
at 68. 
43. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. 
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
44. Miller, 576 U.S. at 461. 
45. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
46. Id. at 570. 
47.  See id. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty   
by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished 
Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 
1014 (2003)). 
48. Id. at 573. 
49. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010). 
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as a forfeiture of the juvenile offender’s life that is irrevocable, and 
to a juvenile it is tantamount to the death penalty itself.50 A 
juvenile offender who is sentenced to LWOP will serve  “more 
years and a greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult 
offender.”51 In reaching this decision, the Court affirmed  that 
“[a]n offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and 
criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness 
into account at all would be flawed.”52 
Arguing in favor of the constitutionality of LWOP sentences 
for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, the State of Florida attempted 
to advance an argument that “[a]ge, as a characteristic of the 
offender, is already deeply woven into the fabric of state criminal 
justice systems.”53 However, the Court, while noting that Florida 
had made efforts to create comprehensive rules governing a 
juvenile offender’s treatment in the criminal justice system, 
maintained that those rules remained insufficient on their own to 
adequately address the constitutional rights of juvenile 
nonhomicide offenders who were sentenced to LWOP.54 
3. Mandatory Life Without Parole for Juvenile Homicide 
Offenders is Unconstitutional 
Following the Court’s decision in Graham, only juvenile 
homicide offenders remained subject to LWOP  sentences; 
however, the spectrum of sentences that can be imposed on a 
juvenile has subsequently been further reduced, while remaining 
consistent with the offender’s Eighth Amendment right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment.55 The Court eliminated 
mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, stating there 
must be some discretion to consider mitigating circumstances 
 
 
50. See id. at 69–70. 
51. Id. at 70. 
52. Id. at 76. 
53. Brief of Respondent at 50, Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (No. 08-7412). 
54. Graham, 560 U.S. at 76. Florida’s efforts included prosecutors being 
required to charge sixteen/seventeen-year-old offenders as adults only for 
certain serious felonies; prosecutors having discretion to charge those 
offenders as adults for other felonies; and prosecutors not being permitted to 
charge non-recidivist sixteen/seventeen-year-old offenders as adults for 
misdemeanors. Id. at 75. 
55. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
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when sentencing youthful offenders.56 These mitigating factors 
include: (1) chronological age; (2) family and home environment; 
(3) peer pressures; (4) inability to deal with police, prosecutors, 
and assist defense attorneys; and (5) the greater potential for 
rehabilitation.57 Taken together, a sentencing scheme that does 
not account for these mitigating factors when imposing mandatory 
LWOP renders such sentences disproportionate.58 
Miller affirmed the bedrock principles that the Supreme 
Court had been building on for years: that children are different 
and that this difference indicates “a sentencing rule permissible 
for adults may not be so for children.”59  In turn, the “imposition  
of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot 
proceed as though they were not children.”60 While the Court 
explicitly declined to address whether the Eighth Amendment 
requires a categorical ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders,61 the 
Court opined that “given all [it has] said in Roper, Graham, and 
[Miller] . . . about children’s diminished culpability and 
heightened capacity for change, . . . appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to th[e] harshest possible penalty will be 
uncommon.”62 
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Analysis Under the United 
States and Rhode Island Constitutions is Identical 
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the 
imposition of the death penalty, LWOP for nonhomicide offenders, 
and mandatory LWOP sentences for homicide offenders violates a 
juvenile offender’s constitutional right under the Eighth 
Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.63 
Therefore, an offender’s right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Rhode Island Constitution must meet at 
 
 
56. See id. at 476. 
57. See id. at 477–78. 
58. See id. at 473. 
59. See id. at 481. 
60. Id. at 474. 
61. See id. at 479. The Court determined that the mandatory LWOP for 
juvenile homicide offenders was sufficient to decide the case. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. at 465; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); Roper v. 
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). 
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least this minimum standard.64 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has affirmed that the 
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 
1, Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution are interpreted 
identically.65 Despite the fact that the Rhode Island Constitution 
has the additional clause that “all punishments ought to be 
proportionated to the offense,”66 the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has explicitly rejected the argument that this difference in 
phrasing results in a divergent test from that set out by the 
United States Supreme Court in accordance with the United 
States Constitution.67 In determining that the  additional 
language of the Rhode Island constitutional provision is already 
inherently part of the Eighth Amendment, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has held that the two constitutional provisions are 
identical.68 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that cruel and 
unusual “punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if it (1) 
makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of 
punishment and hence is nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering; or (2) is grossly out of 
proportion to the severity of the crime.”69 Further, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court found that the application of this second 
factor hinges on a narrow proportionality principle, and as such, 
proportionality is determined by whether the sentence is “grossly 
disproportionate” to the crime.70 Thus, “a constitutional violation 
will be found only in extreme circumstances in which the sentence 
is grossly disproportionate to the offenses for which defendant 
stands convicted.”71 
Factors to consider when determining whether a sentence is 
unjustifiably harsh when compared with the crime charged are 
the nature of the crime, the offender’s criminal history, the 
 
64. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8; State v. Monteiro, 
924 A.2d 784, 795 (R.I. 2007). 
66. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
67. See McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 469 (R.I. 2004). 
68. Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 795; McKinney, 843 A.2d at 466. 
69. McKinney, 843 A.2d at 467 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 
592 (1977)). 
70. Id. at 469. 
71. Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 795. 
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legislature’s intent when it classified the crime, and the public 
safety interest in incapacitating recidivists.72 If the sentence is 
found incommensurate with the gravity of the crime, it is  
rendered disproportionate and unconstitutional under both the 
United States and Rhode Island Constitutions.73 
This, however, should not be misunderstood as a 
determination that Rhode Island is precluded from interpreting 
cruel and unusual punishment differently from the federal 
government.74 Rhode Island, without violating the Supremacy 
Clause, “may grant its citizens broader protection than the 
Federal Constitution requires by enacting appropriate legislation 
or by judicial interpretation of its own Constitution.”75 Therefore, 
a punishment that has been deemed constitutional, or whose 
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment has not been 
addressed, can be deemed cruel and unusual punishment under 
Article 1, Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution.76 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Life Without Parole for Any Juvenile Offender is Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Under the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of the Rhode Island 
Constitution 
In Rhode Island, juvenile homicide offenders remain subject 
to discretionary LWOP, but it remains an open question whether 
this is permissible because the constitutionality of the sentence 
has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court, nor 
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. However, in Miller, the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged its decision to leave 
open the question of whether the Eighth Amendment requires a 
categorical ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders, but “took pains to 
make clear that all such [juvenile LWOP] sentences are now 
suspect.”77 
 
72. McKinney, 843 A.2d at 470. 
73. Id. 
74. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 283 
(Mass. 2013). 
75. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 288 (2008) (emphasis added). 
76. See infra Part II.B. 
77. Perry L. Moriearty, Miller v. Alabama and the Retroactivity of 
Proportionality Rules, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 956 (2015). 
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B. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Makes Limited 
Contribution to the Goals of Punishment 
One of the factors used to determine whether a punishment is 
cruel and unusual is if it “makes no measurable contribution to 
acceptable goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than 
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”78 
The acceptable goals of punishment traditionally include 
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and  rehabilitation.79  
When considering the goals of punishment in connection with a 
juvenile offender, special attention must be paid to the fact that, 
regardless of the severity of a crime committed by a juvenile 
offender, the particular attributes of youthfulness diminish the 
acceptable penological justification for imposing harsh 
sentences.80 
First, juvenile offenders have diminished culpability when 
compared with adults, and retribution purposes are furthered only 
when the sentence is “directly related to the personal culpability  
of the criminal offender.”81 As such, the blameworthiness of the 
offender is related to determining whether the sentence is 
warranted.82 
Second, juvenile offenders are marked by characteristics of 
“immaturity, recklessness, and impetuosity,”83 and punishment 
will only have a deterrent effect when the existence and  severity 
of the punishment creates a disincentive to breaking the law.84 
The impulsivity of juveniles, combined with their irresponsibility 
and recklessness, “make them less likely to consider potential 
punishment” when committing a crime.85 
Third, juvenile offenders being incorrigible is inherently 
inconsistent with the characteristics of youth, and LWOP 
 
78. McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 467 (R.I. 2004). 
79. Sarah A. Kellogg, Just Grow Up  Already:  The  Diminished  
Culpability of Juvenile Gang Members After Miller v. Alabama, 55 B.C. L. 
REV. 265, 276 (2014). 
80. Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460, 472 (2012). 
81. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987). 
82. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (internal citations omitted). 
83. Id. (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 73 (2010)). 
84. Kellogg, supra note 79, at 293. 
85. Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 72). These 
characteristics render juvenile LWOP sentences to make limited contribution 
to both specific and general deterrence goals. See id. at 472–73. 
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punishment will only be justified by incapacitation if there is a 
judgment that the offender is incorrigible—a habitual offender 
who will always be a danger to society and who can only be 
stopped through perpetual imprisonment.86 With juvenile 
offenders, this determination is difficult—if not impossible—to 
make since expert psychologists have problems “differentiat[ing] 
between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreparable corruption.”87 
Lastly, juvenile offenders have a greater capacity for change 
and limited moral culpability, making them amenable to 
rehabilitation, while LWOP “forswears altogether the 
rehabilitative ideal.”88 The rejection of the goal of rehabilitation 
reflects “‘an irrevocable judgment about [an offender’s] value and 
place in society,’ at odds with a child’s capacity for change.”89 
1. Life Without Parole for Juvenile Offenders Violates 
Proportionality 
Central to the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, and by proxy the identical provision of Article 1, 
Section 8, of the Rhode Island Constitution, is the concept of 
proportionality—that a punishment must be proportional to the 
offense in order to escape the constitutional prohibitions against 
cruel and unusual punishment.90 The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has interpreted the proportionality requirement of the 
Rhode Island Constitution the same as that of the United States 
Constitution.91 The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explicitly 
recognized “that the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow 
proportionality principle such that a criminal sentence is excessive 
and unconstitutional if . . . it ‘is grossly out of proportion to the 
 
 
86. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73. 
87. Id. at 73. 
88. Id. at 74. 
89. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 74). 
90. Graham, 560 U.S. at 59; see State v. Ouimette, 479 A.2d 702, 706 
(R.I. 1984). 
91. McKinney v. State, 843 A.2d 463, 470 (R.I. 2004). As the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court have altered the proportionality doctrine, 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has rejected the old tests and adopted the 
new ones. Id. 
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severity of the crime.’”92 
The United States Supreme Court, through its rulings on 
juvenile sentencing, has created a line of reasoning where juvenile 
offenders are not as culpable or deserving of the harshest 
punishments as adult offenders. The Graham Court found that 
LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile offenders violated 
proportionality,93 and “it support[ed] this reasoning by stating 
that juveniles are less culpable than adults. The Court’s  
reasoning [did] not distinguish between the non-homicide and 
homicide juvenile offender; thus, the abolishment of life without 
parole should apply to both groups.”94 As such, LWOP  for  
juvenile homicide offenders violates proportionality because “a 
sentence lacking any legitimate penological justification is by its 
nature disproportionate to the offense.”95 
C. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Can Eliminate LWOP for 
Juvenile Offenders through Interpretation of Article 1, Section 8, of 
the Rhode Island Constitution 
Assuming, arguendo, that LWOP for juvenile offenders does 
not violate the proportionality requirement of the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court has the authority to more strictly interpret Rhode 
Island’s constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment than the United State Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Eighth Amendment, providing more protections for juvenile 
offenders than mandated by the Constitution.96 Both the United 
States Supreme Court and scholars have recognized that 
proportionality cases “exhibit a lack of clarity regarding what 
factors may indicate gross disproportionality,”97 and that “[o]ne 
 
92. State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 794 (R.I. 2007) (quoting McKinney, 
843 A.2d at 467). 
93. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. 
94. Leslie Patrice Wallace, “And I Don’t Know Why It Is That You Threw 
Your Life Away”: Abolishing Life Without Parole, the Supreme Court in 
Graham v. Florida Now Requires States to Give Juveniles Hope for A Second 
Chance, 20 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 35, 59 (2010). 
95. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71; see supra Part II.A.1. 
96. See Samuel Weiss, Note, Into the Breach: The Case for Robust 
Noncapital Proportionality Review Under State Constitutions, 49 HARV. C.R.- 
C.L. L. REV. 569, 569 (2014). 
97. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003). 
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would be hard pressed to identify any other area of constitutional 
law plagued by such confusion at its very roots.”98 In light of this, 
it seems unthinkable that the rights of juveniles to be free from 
LWOP is left subject to a body of law that is unclear, confusing, 
and lacks intelligible criteria. Accordingly, there is a compelling 
reason for the Rhode Island Supreme Court to interpret Rhode 
Island’s proportionality requirement more strictly from that of the 
United States Supreme Court.99 
1. The Rhode Island Supreme Court Has Previously Afforded 
Greater Protections under the Rhode Island Constitution 
As envisioned by Justice Brennan, a state court is permitted 
to find greater protections of rights and liberties within the state 
constitution, and by doing so, is in no way conflicting with federal 
law, so long as the “case [is] plainly decided on independent and 
adequate state grounds.”100 The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
affirmed this when it found greater protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures under Article 1, Section 6, of 
the Rhode Island Constitution than the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constituiton.101 In Pimental, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court was called upon to address the constitutionality of 
sobriety checkpoints, of which “neither [it] nor the United States 
Supreme Court ha[d] considered the constitutionality.”102 
Recognizing an ability to hold sobriety checkpoints 
unconstitutional despite an assumption “that the Fourth 
Amendment would allow the . . . roadblock stops conducted,” the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that “greater protection may 
be afforded to citizens under a state constitution even if the 




98. Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 475, 477 (2005). 
99. See id. at 493. Because Rhode Island has a self-proclaimed parallel 
proportionality requirement to that of the United States Constitution, 
interpreting it differently than that of the United States Supreme Court 
would seemingly lack legitimacy in the absence of compelling reasons. See id. 
100. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The 
Revival of State Constitutions As Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 535, 551 (1986). 
101. See Pimental v. Dep’t of Transp., 561 A.2d 1348, 1352 (R.I. 1989). 
102. Id. at 1351. 
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only establishes a minimum level of protection.”103 
2. Massachusetts’s High Court Has Afforded Greater Protections 
than the Eighth Amendment by Categorically Banning Life 
Without Parole Sentences for Juvenile Offenders 
In 2013, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) 
held “that the discretionary imposition of a sentence of life in 
prison without the possibility of parole on juveniles who are under 
the age of eighteen when they commit murder in the first degree 
violates the prohibition against ‘cruel or unusual punishment[]’ in 
art. 26” of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.104 The SJC 
examined “the unique characteristics of juvenile offenders that 
render them ‘constitutionally different from adults for purposes of 
sentencing,’” and concluded that all juveniles offenders “should be 
afforded a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on 
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’”105 Effectively, this 
decision “declar[ed] all LWOP sentences [for juvenile offenders] 
unconstitutional under Massachusetts’s Article 26.”106 
In line with the reasoning and decision of the SJC, the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court is free to declare all LWOP sentences for 
juvenile offenders unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 8, of 
the Rhode Island Constitution. While the preferable route of the 
elimination of juvenile LWOP sentences is enactment of 
legislation by the Rhode Island General Assembly, if the 
legislature refuses to codify what should be constitutionally 
required, the Rhode Island Supreme Court can still protect the 
rights and liberties of juveniles.107 
 
103. Id. at 1350, 1351 (citations omitted). 
104. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXVI; Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for 
Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284–85 (Mass. 2013) (alteration in original). 
105. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 286–87 (first quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460, 471 (2012); and then quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75 
(2010)). 
106. Erin D. Knight, Note, Brought Back to Life: Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court Resuscitates Parole Eligibility for Juveniles Convicted of First- 
Degree Murder, 49 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 139, 155 (2016). 
107. See id. at 159–60 (arguing that the SJC’s decision in Diatchenko 
warrants the need for legislative action to remedy inconsistencies in the 
sentencing scheme created by that decision, including, that “juveniles 
convicted of second-degree murder, a lesser crime, may receive longer periods 
for establishing parole eligibility than those convicted of first-degree 
murder.”). 
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D. Enactment of Legislation by the General Assembly is a 
Codification of What Should Be Constitutionally Required to 
Protect the Rights and Liberties of Juvenile Offenders 
Through appropriate legislation, the General Assembly can 
amend Title 13, Section 8-13, of the Rhode Island General Laws to 
add additional language providing that “a prisoner sentenced as 
an adult for any offense committed prior to the prisoner’s 
eighteenth birthday, is eligible for a parole permit after the 
prisoner has served fifteen (15) years of [his or her] sentence.”108 
In short, anyone who is convicted of a crime prior to his or her 
eighteenth birthday will be eligible for parole after fifteen years 
served. This amendment has two important ramifications—the 
elimination of LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders, and 
mandatory parole hearings after fifteen years served for juvenile 
offenders who are sentenced as adults and face substantial 
sentences, including multiple life sentences. 
Scientific evidence confirms that juveniles are physically 
different from adults, and these differences directly contribute to 
the decreased blameworthiness of juvenile offenders.109 Because 
juvenile offenders’ frontal lobes are not fully developed, they often 
make decisions based on a “gut response,” rather than reasoning 
through their actions and thinking ahead to the consequences.110 
Juveniles are also plagued by hormonal and emotional changes, 
including testosterone, which is closely associated with 
aggression.111 Because a juvenile offender is still in the early 
stages of the development process, which is reflected by the 
particular characteristics of youth, fifteen years is an appropriate 
length of time to guarantee a parole hearing. Fifteen years allows 
juvenile offenders to mature past the deficiencies associated with 
adolescence and demonstrate rehabilitation, while still requiring 
the offenders to spend a substantial percentage of their lives 
incarcerated. Additionally, juveniles “can generally be expected to 
change more rapidly in the immediate post-offense years, and to a 
 
108. H. 5183, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017); S. 0237A, 2017 
Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2017). 
109. See Brooke Wheelwright, Note, Instilling Hope: Suggested Legislative 
Reform for Missouri Regarding Juvenile Sentencing Pursuant to Supreme 
Court Decisions in Miller and Montgomery, 82 MO. L. REV. 267, 288 (2017). 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
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greater and absolute degree.”112 Thus, the amendment gives a 
juvenile offender the opportunity to demonstrate those changes to 
a parole board more immediately than the traditional sentencing 
scheme would allow for. 
E. The Rhode Island Attorney General’s Argument Against 
Categorically Banning LWOP for Juvenile Offenders is Insufficient 
to Protect the Rights of Juveniles and to Support an 
Unconstitutional Sentencing Scheme 
The current Rhode Island Attorney General (RIAG) is a 
staunch opponent of enacting legislation that eliminates LWOP 
for juveniles because it “will preclude the use of the LWOP 
sentencing statute for the as-yet unknown juvenile criminal who 
commits an unimaginably horrific crime.”113 The opposition by  
the RIAG relies on the gruesome nature of a crime to support the 
continued possibility of LWOP for a juvenile offender, which is 
parallel to the argument advanced by the State of Alabama in 
Miller.114 However, the United States Supreme Court invalidated 
such an argument by pointing out that “none of what it said about 
children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental traits 
and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”115 In turn, 
the distinctive traits and vulnerabilities of juveniles, which render 
the imposition of LWOP a cruel and unusual punishment, are just 
as relevant when an unimaginably horrific crime has been 
committed. 
The RIAG further opposes the legislation on the grounds that 




112. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.11A cmt. h. (AM. LAW INST., 
Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011). 
113. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin, R.I. Attorney Gen., to Dominick J. 
Ruggerio, President, R.I. Senate (June 5, 2017) (on file with author). This 
letter of opposition was written by the current RIAG, Peter Kilmartin, who 
will be term limited in January 2019. Therefore, depending on the stance of 
the newly elected RIAG, the opposition to reforming juvenile sentencing 
legislation by categorically banning LWOP for juvenile offenders may or may 
not be met with the same opposition from the newly elected Attorney 
General’s office. 
114. Brief of Respondent in Opposition to Petition at 19–20, Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (No. 10-9646), 2011 WL 5322572, at *19–20. 
115. Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. 
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justice system.116 The RIAG posits that “Rhode Island has a 
juvenile criminal justice system based on judicial discretion and 
deference to the sensitive nature of juvenile punishment and 
rehabilitation.”117 However, the judicial deference and sensitivity 
he speaks of does not cure the unconstitutionality of imposing a 
cruel and unusual punishment on juveniles because: 
a case-by-case approach requiring that the particular 
offender’s age be weighed against the seriousness of the 
crime as part of a gross disproportionality inquiry would 
not allow courts to distinguish with sufficient accuracy 
the few juvenile offenders having sufficient psychological 
maturity and depravity to merit a life without parole 
sentence from the many that have the capacity for 
change.118 
Additional checks the RIAG cites are: (1) “a waiver hearing at the 
Family Court as the result of which the Family Court deemed it 
appropriate to have that juvenile offender tried as an adult”; (2) in 
adult court “the juvenile would be tried and afforded the 
protections of due process just like any other criminal offender”; 
and (3) when sentencing the “Court would use all appropriate 
factors, including the offender’s age and prospects for 
rehabilitation, to determine the suitable sentence for the crimes 
involved.”119 However, as  will be further explained, all fall short 
of curing the unconstitutionality of LWOP sentences for any 
juvenile offender. 
1. A Waiver Hearing in Family Court Has Limited Utility 
The first check the RIAG cites is “a waiver hearing at the 
Family Court as the result of which the Family Court deemed it 
appropriate to have that juvenile offender tried as an adult.”120 
While this certainly does allow discretion for whether a transfer to 
adult court is warranted, it has limited utility because, at such an 
early pre-trial stage, the judge will have only partial information 
 
116. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note 
113. 
117. Id. 
118. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 50–51 (2010). 
119. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note 
113. 
120. Id. 
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about the offender or the offense. Therefore, “[t]he key moment  
for the exercise of discretion is the transfer—and . . . the judge 
often does not know then what she will learn, about the offender 
or the offense, over the course of the proceedings.”121  In  turn, 
with such limited information, if the waiver hearing judge does 
transfer the juvenile to adult court, he or she is making the 
decision to subject the juvenile offender to a sentencing scheme 
that allows for the possibility of LWOP.122 While the United 
States Supreme Court did note that discretionary, rather than 
mandatory, sentencing in adult courts would provide the option 
for a “judge or jury [to] choose, rather than a life-without-parole 
sentence, a lifetime prison term with the possibility of parole or a 
lengthy term of years,”123 the Court clearly did not consider this 
an absolute cure to satisfy the Eighth Amendment problem of 
LWOP for juvenile offenders, as it left open the question of 
whether the Eighth Amendment requires a categorical ban on 
LWOP for juvenile offenders.124 
2. A Juvenile’s Inability to Assist in His or Her Defense Hinders 
Due Process in Adult Court 
The second check the RIAG cites is that, once a juvenile 
offender has been waived into adult court, “the juvenile would be 
tried and afforded the protections of due process just like any 
other criminal offender.”125 Here, the RIAG’s argument is simply 
ignoring the main tenet of the cases the United States Supreme 
Court has decided regarding juvenile sentencing—that juveniles 
are not like every other adult criminal offender, and just because 
juveniles may be afforded the same protections does not mean that 
 
 
121. Miller v. Alabama, 576 U.S. 460,  488  (2012).  In  juvenile  court, 
Miller was denied a request for his own mental health expert at the transfer 
hearing, which was affirmed on appeal because, at that time, Miller was not 
entitled to the services he would receive at trial. Id. However, the point the 
Court was making was that since Alabama had a mandatory LWOP 
sentencing scheme, even if an expert’s testimony would mitigate Miller’s 
culpability, it would not matter because the mandatory LWOP sentence 
would inevitably apply. Id. 
122. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2002). 
123. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
124. Id. at 479. 
125. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note 
113. 
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those protections work with the same effectiveness.126 In fact,  
“the features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them 
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings,” including 
“[d]ifficulty in weighing long-term consequences; a corresponding 
impulsiveness; and reluctance to trust defense counsel, seen as 
part of the adult world a rebellious youth rejects.”127 Juveniles 
have a limited understanding of the criminal justice system, are 
not well equipped to deal effectively with police or prosecutors, 
and cannot effectively assist in their own defense.128 The same 
logic that led the United States Supreme Court in Graham to 
conclude that a categorical ban on LWOP for nonhomicide juvenile 
offenders avoided “the risk that, as a result of these difficulties, a 
court or jury will erroneously conclude that a particular juvenile is 
sufficiently culpable to deserve life without parole,”129  applies 
with equal force for a categorical ban on LWOP for any juvenile 
offender because the distinctive traits of juveniles are not crime- 
specific.130 
3. Using Factors to Determine a Suitable Sentence Can Never 
Account for all the Unique Characteristics of Juveniles 
The third check the RIAG cites is that once the juvenile 
offender is found guilty in adult court, the “Court would use all 
appropriate factors, including the offender’s age and prospects for 
rehabilitation, to determine a suitable sentence for the crimes 
involved.”131 There are numerous factors the United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that are relevant when analyzing 
the culpability of a juvenile defendant, including chronological 
age, family background, peer pressure, mental development, and 
emotional development.132 In theory, if, after analyzing all  of 
these factors, the sentencing judge conclusively determines that 
the juvenile offender shows an irretrievably depraved character, it 
 
126. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010). 
127. Id. at 78. 
128. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 477; Graham, 560 U.S. at 78. 
129. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78–79. 
130. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 473. 
131. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note 
113. The “jury must also make specific findings beyond a reasonable doubt 
before the court can even consider imposing an [sic] LWOP sentence.” Id. 
132. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 476 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 116 (1982)). 
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would then be appropriate to sentence the juvenile to LWOP.133 
However, it is impossible for a sentencing judge to ever make such 
a finding with reliability because “the brain of a juvenile is not 
fully developed either structurally or functionally, by the age of 
eighteen, [so] a judge cannot find with confidence that a particular 
offender, at that point in time, is irretrievably depraved.”134 The 
one characteristic of youthful offenders that should conclusively 
determine that LWOP sentences are never appropriate is a 
juvenile’s great propensity for change, which makes rehabilitation 
the appropriate sentence, not life incarceration.135 
4. A Categorical Ban on LWOP for Juvenile Offenders Does Not 
Undermine the Sentencing Process Because It Does Not Guarantee 
Eventual Freedom 
The final argument the RIAG advances against abolishing 
LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders is that it will “undermine 
the sentencing process for victims and their  families.”136  
However, as the SJC pointed out in its decision to categorically 
ban LWOP for juvenile offenders in Massachusetts, a categorical 
ban on LWOP for juvenile offenders “should not be construed to 
suggest that individuals who are under the age of eighteen when 
they commit murder in the first degree necessarily should be 
placed on parole once they have served a statutorily designated 
portion of their sentences.”137 Rather, once the juvenile offender 
has served fifteen years, it will be in the purview of the state 
parole board: 
to evaluate the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the crime, including the age of the 
offender, together will all relevant information pertaining 
to the offender’s character and actions during the 
intervening years since conviction. By this process, a 
juvenile homicide offender will be afforded a meaningful 
 
 
133. See Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 284 
(Mass. 2013). 
134. Id. 
135. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). 
136. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra note 
113. 
137. Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 286. 
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opportunity to be considered for parole suitability.138 
As advocated by the Senator who sponsored the bill in the Rhode 
Island Senate, “[w]e are not opening the jailhouse doors. It does 
not guarantee the release of any youth. It is possible that some 
children will spend the rest of their lives in prison.”139 Victims  
and their families will have the same opportunity to testify at the 
mandated fifteen-year parole hearing, and the juvenile offender 
will still have to demonstrate to the parole board all of the 
qualities that would make any other prisoner eligible for parole. 
This legislation is simply mandating that the parole opportunity 
be available after fifteen years served. 
CONCLUSION 
To this day, Craig Price remains behind bars at a prison in 
Florida—not for the murders he committed as a juvenile, since at 
the time of his sentencing Rhode Island Law required him to be 
released at twenty-one140—but rather due to a string of charges 
levied against him while in prison, including contempt of court 
and contraband in prison.141 Despite being one-thousand miles 
away and locked up in Florida, Rhode Island continues to live in 
the shadow of fear created by its “state demon.” As a result, seven 
juvenile offenders are currently imprisoned in Rhode Island and 
face lengthy sentences.142 Moreover, the constitutionally 
 
138. Id. at 287. 
139. Tempera, supra note 26. Senator Harold Metts represents District 6 
of Providence, and introduced the legislation in the Rhode Island Senate. 
140. See supra Introduction. 
141. Tim White, Craig Price charged with attempted murder in Florida 
prison  stabbing, WPRI NEWS (May 31, 2017, 9:48 PM), 
http://wpri.com/2017/05/31/craig-price-charged-with-attempted-murder-in- 
florida-prison-stabbing/. 
142. If this legislation took effect by the end of 2017, it would affect the 
sentences of seven juvenile offenders: Russell Burrell, who is serving four 
consecutive life sentences; Robert Winston, who is serving twenty-six years; 
Jose Lopez, who is serving consecutive life sentences; Somesack 
Phonepraseuth, who is serving forty years; Phearan Rot, who is serving life; 
John Price, who is serving fifty years; and Edwin McGill, who is serving 
thirty years. Letter from Peter F. Kilmartin to Dominick J. Ruggerio, supra 
note 113. Quandell Husband was also mentioned in Attorney General 
Kilmartin’s letter of opposition, but Husband’s sentence was vacated and he 
recently pled to twenty years to serve. See Katie Mulvaney, Life sentences 
overturned, Providence man to serve 20 years for role in triple killing, 
PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 29, 2017, 8:45 PM), http://www.providencejournal.com/ 
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protected right of juvenile offenders to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment has been circumvented for fear of having to 
face another gruesome juvenile killer and the desire to have the 
option to keep that juvenile in prison for life. 
In light of what is scientifically known about juveniles, which 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized makes juveniles 
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing, a 
sentencing scheme that allows for LWOP for juveniles cannot be 
constitutionally supported. Rhode Island must get out from under 
the shadow of fear created decades ago and enact legislation that 
will safeguard the rights and liberties of juvenile offenders. 
Ensuring that juvenile offenders have a meaningful opportunity to 
obtain release after a minimum of fifteen years served not only 
preserves their constitutional rights, but also embodies the motto 
that Rhode Island so proudly calls its own: “Hope.” Eliminating 
LWOP sentencing for juveniles will give every juvenile offender 
hope—hope that one day they will be given the opportunity to 
demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required to obtain 
parole release. 
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